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Organizing the Office of the United States Attorney
Christian M Halliburtont
After decades if not centuries of relative stability, the operation
and Office of the United States Attorney was thrown into deep political
turmoil in 2006. What had long been considered a position defined by its
independence, integrity, and commitment to principles of law, was sud-
denly being subject to largely covert partisan pressures and increasingly
aggressive centralized management by the Department of Justice. The
American public, and many of the U.S. Attorneys themselves, remained
largely unaware of these backstage manipulations until the press an-
nounced the mass exodus of nine highly esteemed U.S. Attorneys from
around the country, each of whom may have lost their job because of the
perceived threat they individually and collectively posed to the Bush
Administration's political hegemony and socio-legal agenda.
The termination of these high-performing U.S. Attorneys, together
with a number of forced resignations occurring during the same period of
time, has provoked substantial criticism and close scrutiny of the people
who brought about these terminations and of the reasons for their actions.
Indeed, given the constitutional, statutory, and historical basis of the Of-
fice of the United States Attorney, both the policies and practices of the
current White House administration and the Department of Justice have
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been called into serious question, and answers have not been readily
forthcoming.
This shameful spectacle (which former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzalez flippantly referred to as nothing more than "an overblown per-
sonnel matter"1) played itself out in the national news, and was
characterized by ineffectual congressional inquiries, less-than-credible
finger-pointing by current and former Administration officials, and the
most remarkable loss of communal short term memory since the Iran-
Contra debacle. Yet this is not simply an instance of the government
circus run amok; it also represents a tremendous challenge to the pursuit
of social justice. By ignoring the founding principles of political equality
and faithful service of the rule of law, many actors in this political drama
have willingly compromised the system of rules and procedures origi-
nally adopted to protect against the arbitrary abuse of government power.
The delicate balance anticipated by that system is reflected in the
constitutional and statutory framework organizing the Office of the
United States Attorney. Most saliently, the Constitution provides that
"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose appointments . . . shall be established by law."2
While the United States Attorney is one of those officers "whose ap-
pointments shall be established by law,"3 it is also the case that the Of-
fice is essential to the Executive's obligation to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.",4 In general, presidential power to appoint am-
bassadors and officers of the United States, including U.S. Attorneys, is
nearly plenary (assuming that the advice and consent of the Senate is
obtained), and is construed as being essential to the discharge of the Ex-
ecutive office. Although it is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution
itself, the President's power of removal is inferred from the existence of
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1. Alberto R. Gonzales, They Lost My Confidence, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2007, at 1 OA.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 541 (a)-(c) (2006):
(a) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a
United States attorney for each judicial district.
(b) Each United States attorney shall be appointed for a term of four years. On the
expiration of his term, a United States attorney shall continue to perform the duties of his
office until his successor is appointed and qualifies.
(c) Each United States attorney is subject to removal by the President.
Id. (emphasis added).
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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5the power to appoint, and is nearly as broad as that appointment power.
According to the few judicial decisions construing the removal power,
the President's otherwise plenary authority is limitable only if independ-
ence in the position is constitutionally desirable, and only if the limita-
tion does not prohibit removal altogether, but instead retains some ver-
sion of a "good cause" provision.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Attorney position is one characterized by a
broad delegation of the duty to enforce the laws of the United States, and
to appear on behalf of the government in any civil action involving the
United States or its revenues. 6 This delegation of duties necessarily en-
tails the exercise of discretion, and that exercise of discretion necessarily
depends on the United States Attorneys' independence of judgment.7
The U.S. Attorney can thus be described as an agent with multiple prin-
ciples, or a servant of two masters: 8 the U.S. Attorneys clearly serve at
the "pleasure" of the President, must be responsive to the Department of
Justice, and must also consider local conditions, and yet the Attorneys'
ultimate duty is to serve, advance, and enforce the law while ensuring
uniform application of just principles. 9 In this regard,
[t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore . is not that it shall win a [given]
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 541(c), supra note 3.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2006):
Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his district,
shall-
(1) prosecute for all offenses against the United States;
(2) prosecute or defend, for the Government, all civil actions, suits or proceedings in
which the United States is concerned;
(3) appear in behalf of the defendants in all civil actions, suits or proceedings pending in
his district against collectors, or other officers of the revenue or customs for any act done
by them or for the recovery of any money exacted by or paid to these officers, and by
them paid into the Treasury;
(4) institute and prosecute proceedings for the collection of fines, penalties, and forfei-
tures incurred for violation of any revenue law, unless satisfied on investigation that jus-
tice does not require the proceedings; and
(5) make such reports as the Attorney General may direct.
See also Judiciary Act of 1789, Sess. 1, Ch. 10, Sec. 35 ("And there shall be appointed in each dis-
trict a ... person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall
be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office" whose duty "shall be to prosecute in
such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United
States" and to prosecute "all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned.").
7. JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL
AND LEGAL SYSTEMS, (The John Hopkins University Press, 1978) (1978).
8. See H. W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys-Whom Shall They Serve?, 61 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (1998).
9. Id. at 131-34.
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case, but thatjustice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law.1
0
While the U.S. Attorney serves in an at-will position and remains
subject to removal by the President, the relationship between the U.S.
Attorney and the Attorney General does not resemble that
agent-principle structure. Indeed, the Office of the Attorney General and
the Office of the United States Attorney were originally created in the
same act of Congress and were clearly designed as peer law enforcement
officers with separate jurisdictions. Even today, the Attorney General
does not possess supervisory authority, with respect to the United States
Attorney, beyond the authority to direct the preparation of reports, 2 and
is not legally authorized to appoint or remove persons serving in that
role. 13 However, the United States Code was amended in March of 2006
in a little-noticed manner that substantially altered the balance of power
between the President and the Senate and between the Attorney General
and the United States Attorney specifically.
In the course of reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 546 was amended to (1) delete the preexisting 120-day time limit that
had applied to the Attorney General's interim appointments (those neces-
sary to fill vacancies that arise); (2) permit indefinite tenure of interim
appointees so long as the President declines to appoint, or the Senate
fails to approve, a permanent successor; and (3) completely eliminate the
role previously played by the federal district court for the district in
which the vacancy exists. 14 Thus, the Executive power ostensibly may
be used to remove a United States Attorney from a position which is then
filled, not by the President and Congress, but by the Attorney General,
and for a term bounded only by the President's willingness to advance
10. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 6. ("And there shall also be appointed a ... person,
learned in the law, to act as an attorney general for the United States, who shall be sworn or affirmed
to faithful execution of his office." The Attorney General's duty shall be "to prosecute and conduct
all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned" and "to give his advice
and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President.").
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 547(5), supra note 6.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 542 (2006) (providing that the Attorney general "may appoint one or more
assistant United States Attorneys in any district when the public interest so requires," and that "each
assistant United States Attorney is subject to removal by the Attorney General.")
14. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 546 (2006):
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the Attorney General may appoint a United
States attorney for the district in which the office of the United States attorney is vacant.
(b) The Attorney General shall not appoint as United States attorney a person to whose
appointment by the President to that office the Senate refused to give advice and consent.
(c) A person appointed as United States attorney under this section may serve until ...
the qualification of a United States attorney for such district appointed by the President
under section 541 of this title.
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new appointees.15 Recognizing that it has been shut out of the process,
both Houses of Congress have responded by proposing bills to restore
the previous checks on the appointment and removal power and to limit
the Attorney General's participation in vacancy-filling procedures.'
6
The questions implicitly raised by a review of these structural con-
siderations are in many respects answered by the authors whose work is
published in this Issue of the Seattle University Law Review. Between a
leading expert on matters of law, government, and ethics, and perhaps
the authority on the history and functioning of the U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice, and in conjunction with the reflections of a former holder of the Of-
fice who lived this experience, three voices of reason, courage, and integ-
rity call us to reevaluate our own commitment to the ideal of justice as
transcendent of partisan political corruption, and challenge us to manifest
that ideal.
Starting us off where any thorough examination of law and gov-
ernment must, Professor James Eisenstein's article, The U.S. Attorney
Firings of 2006: Main Justice's Centralization Efforts in Historical Con-
text, richly describes the historical origins and evolution of the Office of
the United States Attorney. The article evokes the inherent tension be-
tween the Department of Justice's effort to exert consistent managerial
control from the "top," and the individual U.S. Attorney's need for deci-
sional latitude, professional discretion, and political autonomy "in the
field." While detailing the many ways in which politically accountable
actors have a legitimate role to play in the selection, appointment, and
supervision of United States Attorneys, he depicts a system which never-
theless left the individual U.S. Attorneys free to exercise their principled,
professional judgment without the expectation of retaliation. Against
that historical backdrop, the 2006 mass termination of nine U.S. Attor-
neys, all of whom had received positive performance reviews, appears as
a singular example of politically driven interference by the executive
branch.
Former United States Attorney John McKay brings that historical
perspective into the present by describing his own, first-hand experience
of ably serving his district and then subsequently being fired for unar-
ticulated and largely unarticulable reasons. In Train Wreck at the Justice
Department: An Eyewitness Account, Professor McKay documents in
painstaking detail the way in which these events unfolded in late 2006
and early 2007, and provides a rock-solid accounting of the shadowy
political forces that conspired to cleanse the Office of the U.S. Attorney
15. Id.
16. See H.R. 520, S. 214, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
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of professionals who were not in perfect compliance with President
Bush's and the Attorney General's preferred brand of ideology. Profes-
sor McKay's Train Wreck also provides a helpful discussion of the con-
crete legal issues raised by this alleged mismanagement or misconduct,
analyzes a number of federal laws (both civil and criminal) that may
have been broken in the process, and ultimately proposes several ways to
guarantee better accountability by government actors in the future.
Finally, Professor Laurie Levenson effectively demonstrates that
the "problem" of the U.S. Attorney terminations is not limited to the im-
mediate effect of losing a talented and well-qualified government lawyer,
but is in fact exacerbated by the process by which position-filling interim
appointments are made. As a consequence of the passage of the
PATRIOT Act and its recent reauthorization, responsibility for filling
vacancies created by the Department of Justice now belongs to that same
agency rather than to the United States District Court for the district in
which the vacancy exists, as it previously had. In Live and Learn: Depo-
liticizing the Interim Appointment of U.S. Attorneys, Professor Levenson
suggests that many of the interim appointees lacked the qualifications
and experience of those they replaced, and includes interim appointments
as among the factors leading to greater politicization and partisan control
of this most important nationwide Office. Particularly useful, given the
lack of concern and responsiveness shown by the Bush White House, are
Professor Levinson's concrete proposals for legislative reform of the ap-
pointment procedures and her calls for greater participation by the Senate
in both permanent and interim U.S. Attorney selection processes. To her
great credit, Professor Levenson charts a path back to the robust congres-
sional participation envisioned by the founding generation as a way to
limit the accretion and abuse of Executive authority.
Individually, the three authors published in this Issue each present
startling arguments about the failure of our legal system to ensure that
the administration of justice remains oriented around public rather than
private political values, and each presents a call for reform focused on a
subsidiary element of the dysfunctional system. Collectively, the authors
have painted a picture of the Bush Administration and its present prac-
tices that should serve as a wake-up call to any fair-minded individual
who fears abusive oligarchies, and they have identified guideposts along
a route leading to change and to restoration of traditional notions of just
governance and the primacy of the rule of law. Because these critical
assessments of the recent past and related calls for reform have such deep
salience for the ultimate pursuit of anti-oppressive, equality-oriented so-
cial justice, it is a tremendous honor to showcase these experts in this
issue of the Seattle University Law Review.
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